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ABSTRACT 
 
 This paper examines the “Sandy Springs-model,” which is characterized by 
outsourcing the vast majority of municipal government services to the private sector. 
Privatization and outsourcing are widely seen as a way to deliver government services 
more effectively and efficiently, but few governments have privatized to the extent that 
Sandy Springs, Georgia, has done so.  
 A performance analysis was conducted with Sandy Springs against neighboring 
municipal governments in northern Fulton County. The analysis compared expenditure 
per capita figures against the corresponding government output with an assigned points 
system for fiscal years 2008 through 2012. The analysis found that Sandy Springs does 
not have the most efficient or effective government in the sample, and was below 
average across the board. Further, cities that turned from a private sector-model to a 
more traditional model of service delivery found efficiency and performance gains.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 “Here’s how to do it,” proclaimed The Economist (2012). After almost eight 
years of existence, its elected officials, administrators, and citizens have already deemed 
the city of Sandy Springs, a northern suburb of Atlanta, Georgia, a success. From a 
policy and academic standpoint, what makes Sandy Springs so interesting is that it has 
outsourced the vast majority of municipal services to private companies. Outside of 
police and fire personnel, the city employs seven full-time workers to administer a 
government for a population of almost 100,000. 
 What Sandy Springs is doing is the highest-profile and most extreme example of 
the “reinventing government” movement, as coined by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler. 
This philosophy infuses the ideals of the private markets to reintroduce competition, 
efficiency, and accountability to the public sector.  
Research Question 
 This paper seeks to address whether the “Sandy Springs model” is, in fact, the 
way to do it. The city will undergo a performance analysis against its fiercest 
competitors: its neighboring cities in northern Fulton County. This area north of Atlanta 
has a long history of citizens being acutely aware of the stewardship of tax dollars and 
quality of public services. In fact, the city of Sandy Springs was incorporated in 
December 2005 because citizens were not happy with the level of government services 
provided by Fulton County. 
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 The particular cities in question are Alpharetta, Johns Creek, Milton, Roswell, 
and Sandy Springs. This includes all cities in northern Fulton County, except for 
Mountain Park, which was excluded due to being an outlier with regard to its very small 
population. This study analyzes the actual dollars spent on a bundle of services, and 
compares those values to relevant outputs of each municipal government over fiscal 
years 2008 through 2012. This provides the foundation to help determine which city’s 
government is most effective. 
Outsourcing and Privatization 
 One of the principles enshrined in Reinventing Government by Osborne and 
Gaebler is that governments ought to “steer,” not “row.” By separating the policy 
decisions (steering) from implementation and service delivery (rowing), policymakers 
can focus more on governance and less on doing (1992, pp. 34-35). One way to do this is 
by contracting for services with non-profit organizations or businesses in the private 
sector. Osborne and Gaebler provide many other ways to alternatively provide services 
besides the traditional public sector model, as elaborated in the literature review. 
Outsourcing public services provides great promise to enhance efficiency, 
accountability, and government performance. However, as with any other public policy, 
the implementation is key for success. Critics have plenty of cases to point to of 
privatization projects gone awry, resulting in poorer service at the same or higher costs. 
These and other, more theoretically founded, criticisms of outsourcing and privatization 
can be found in the literature review. 
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 What makes the case of Sandy Springs so interesting is the extent to which the 
city privatized its government services. With the exception of public safety (which the 
Georgia Constitution requires to be provided by the public sector), almost every 
government service is provided by the private sector. When Sandy Springs was 
incorporated in 2005, the city contracted with CH2M-Hill to provide the vast majority of 
government services. In fiscal year 2008, the first year of this analysis, the city had 
thirteen public employees: city manager, assistant city manager, grants administrator, 
finance director, city clerk, municipal court clerk, and seven elected officials including 
mayor and council. CH2M-Hill was contracted to provide general operations, finance, 
municipal court, public works, recreation, and community development services. 
 For fiscal year 2012, the city rebid the contract to provide services for the city. 
This time, instead of awarding the contract to one company, the city decided to award 
contracts to a number of companies to provide a specific service. This move resulted in a 
savings of more than $7 million per year, totaling more than $35 million over the five-
year life of the contract. According to policymakers, contracting with the new firms was 
purely a fiscal decision, and not necessarily a reflection on the quality of service 
provided by CH2M-Hill (Murchison, 2011; City of Sandy Springs, 2011). The new 
contracts awarded are as follows: 
• The Collaborative: Communications, Community Development 
• Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc.: Municipal Court, Recreation and Parks 
• URS Corporation: Public Works 
• Severn Trent: Financial Services 
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• InterDev: Information Services 
 Throughout this analysis, it is important to remember the words of Osborne and 
Gaebler on privatization and government services: 
But we should not mistake this for some grand ideology of privatizing 
government. When governments contract with private businesses, both 
conservatives and liberals often talk as if they are shifting a fundamental public 
responsibility to the private sector. This is nonsense: they are shifting the 
delivery of services, not the responsibility for services (1992, p. 47). 
Cities Chosen for Analysis 
 The cities chosen for this analysis include the neighboring cities of Sandy 
Springs in northern Fulton County, Georgia. This includes Alpharetta, Johns Creek, 
Milton, and Roswell. In addition to being geographically close, they are also 
economically and demographically similar and drastically different from the cities in 
southern Fulton County, including parts of Atlanta. The following shows the stark 
contrasts between the different areas in 2006. (Note: the northern Fulton County figures 
include data from Mountain Park, though its data are excluded from this study’s analysis 
henceforth.) 
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Table 1.1: Economic and Sociological Indicators of Fulton County 
 
Northern Fulton 
County 
Southern Fulton 
County 
Median Household Income $86,743 $36,930 
Per Capita Income $43,367 $21,093 
Households w/ Income under $10,000 4,407 34,696 
Families Receiving Food Stamps 2,678 41,183 
Families Receiving TANF Benefits 119 2481 
African American Population (%) 8.0% 62.8% 
(Source: Ertas, Kim, Matthews, & Wheeler, 2009, Table 2.2) 
 Northern Fulton County has been quite vocal about the quality of services it has 
received over the years. The area long has been acutely aware of the quality of services 
provided by Fulton County. Dissatisfaction with the amount of tax dollars given to 
Fulton County, who was responsible for providing these services, and with the level of 
service provided, in part, are the reasons why Sandy Springs (and others) incorporated. 
Some criticize this move as white flight from the poorer areas of Fulton County. It is 
estimated that Fulton County loses around $38 million of tax revenue per year as a result 
of the incorporation of Sandy Springs, Johns Creek, and Milton (Segal, 2012). This has 
resulted in significant financial strain for the county. 
 That aside, northern Fulton County is a great case study for the analysis of the 
performance of privatization. The economics and demographics are similar, the 
constituents are mindful of government performance, and each city takes a different tack 
in attempting to be most effective at providing government services to their constituents. 
Sandy Springs, as previously noted, is the most privatized of the five cities. Alpharetta is 
a city that provides its services through the traditional public sector model. Johns Creek 
was incorporated a year after Sandy Springs, in 2006, and also contracted with CH2M-
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Hill to provide a wide range of services, including administration, public works, and 
community development (“History of Johns Creek,” 2013; “Public/Private Partnership, 
2013). In October 2010, the city restructured its contract with the firm so that CH2M-
Hill still provides public works and community development services, but the city 
administers the rest with public employees (“Public/Private Partnership,” 2013). The city 
of Milton also incorporated in 2006, and similar to Sandy Springs and Johns Creek, 
awarded a contract for all government services to CH2M-Hill. After three years, the city 
decided it would be cheaper if it hired its own personnel: a savings of $1.26 million in 
FY2010 (City of Milton, 2010b). The city of Milton now primarily provides services 
through the traditional public sector model, but some things are contracted or 
subcontracted where cost-savings can be found. Roswell legally became a city in 1854, 
and provides government services through a traditional public sector model.  
Table 1.2: Population Data from Selected Cities 
City/ 
Year 
Pop. Est. 
2008 
Pop. Est. 
2009 
Pop.  
2010 
Pop. Est. 
2011 
Pop. Est. 
2012 
Alpharetta 54,830 56,286 57,551 59,387 61,981 
Johns Creek 72,844 74,929 76,728 79,473 82,306 
Milton 29,210 31,119 32,661 33,893 35,015 
Roswell 85,751 87,089 88,346 91,142 93,692 
Sandy Springs 90,980 92,466 93,853 96,944 99,419 
(Source: US Census Bureau) 
Statement of Problem 
 Privatization and contracting for services have been utilized by city governments 
and analyzed by scholars for decades, but these practices and analyses are usually 
limited to particular programs. Privatization has not been utilized to the degree that 
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Sandy Springs has embraced the practice for delivering government services, and thus 
the scholarship on this is lacking. This study seeks to be a first step in the analysis of 
essentially a fully privatized city government by looking at government performance 
across five fiscal years.  
Purpose of Study 
 The purpose of this study is to measure government performance for these five 
selected cities over a five-year span. The study seeks to answer the question, “Is the 
Sandy Springs model more efficient and effective than those of its neighboring cities?” 
The study analyzes the inputs and outputs of each city between fiscal years 2008 and 
2012 for both core municipal government services and public safety services. Each city 
received a performance score for each fiscal year and conclusions are drawn based on 
these scores.  
Summary of Literature Review 
 Since the beginning of the privatization movement, there has been fierce debate 
over its efficiency, effectiveness, and what privatization means for accountability in 
government. The literature review surveys a wide swath of the theoretical, ideological, 
and economic considerations that arise when analyzing the effectiveness of privatization. 
There is a discussion of Osborne and Gaebler’s Reinventing Government, as well as the 
New Public Management and New Public Service paradigms. The literature review also 
includes discussions on public goods, and of economic and theoretical motivations for 
privatization, and analysis of other privatization case studies to date.  
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Summary of Methodology 
 The study seeks to perform a performance analysis, examining comparable inputs 
and outputs. The inputs are the total expenditure per capita each year for FY2008 
through 2012. The total expenditure is comprised of comparable city government 
departments and then is divided by city population figures of that year to determine 
expenditure per capita. The outputs are intended to measure the performance and 
capacity of each city’s community development, finance, parks and recreation, and 
public works departments, as well as the city’s overall quality of life. These outputs were 
ranked against each other and points were assigned for the purposes of running a 
performance analysis model.  
Limitations of Study 
 Although the results of this study are interesting, it is unclear whether broader 
conclusions can be drawn from the results. Sandy Springs is a newly incorporated 
affluent city, and the study is a comparison against other successful (some newly 
incorporated) affluent cities. This has been the case with most other privatization case 
studies; their results provide anecdotal evidence, at best. In the case of this study, it 
would be necessary to do a broader study if Sandy Springs is found to be the most 
effective government out of this sample.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Since the beginning of the privatization movement, there has been fierce debate 
over its efficiency and effectiveness, and about what privatization means for 
accountability in government. This literature review surveys a wide swath of the 
theoretical, ideological, and economic considerations that arise when analyzing the 
effectiveness of privatization. This includes the Reinventing Government, New Public 
Management, and New Public Service movements; economic literature on public goods; 
economic and theoretical motivations for privatization; literature on the cases for and 
against privatization; an analysis of other privatization case studies; and literature thus 
far on the experiments in Sandy Springs and Fulton County, in particular.  
Reinventing Government 
 The quintessential reading, which frames the discussion when first tackling the 
issue of privatization, is David Osborne’s and Ted Gaebler’s Reinventing Government. 
The authors argue that government (in the 1990s, and ostensibly also today) is a 
bureaucracy with a lot of dedicated people operating in bad systems, with incentives 
built in that are counter-productive. Instead of reforming the organization to improve 
performance, government has eliminated services, which is similar to cutting off a few 
fingers and toes instead of going on a diet (Osborne, 1993, p. 350). Government is 
providing services in an outmoded way and should be reformed by infusing 
entrepreneurial principles so that the government can be more productive.  
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 The authors provide ten principles for an entrepreneurial, more productive 
government: The public sector ought to be catalytic, community-owned, competitive, 
mission-driven, results-oriented, customer-driven, enterprising, anticipatory, 
decentralized, and market-oriented. The most applicable of these to the present study are 
elaborated below. 
 For a government to become a catalyst, it ought to separate “steering” from 
“rowing.” This provides public bureaucracies with the flexibility to adapt to changing 
conditions. By separating policy decisions (steering) from service delivery (rowing), 
policymakers can focus more on governance and less on doing (Osborne & Gaebler, 
1992, pp. 34-35). In Reinventing Government, Osborne and Gaebler provide 36 
alternatives to standard public service delivery, ranging from traditional to “avant-garde” 
(1992, p. 31). This insight is especially prescient in the post-2008 recessionary fiscal 
climate, giving public institutions more flexibility to experiment with ways to deliver 
services effectively. 
 In the old model of service delivery, bureaucracies “rowed” by providing 
services, which create a monopoly in the market. To reinvent government, competition 
needs to be introduced to provide incentives to heighten levels of production. An 
example cited by Osborne (1993) is the City of Phoenix deciding to contract out garbage 
collection. The manager of the department of public works decided to put in a bid 
against private companies. Though the department lost the bid, ten years later it won 
back the bid at half the previous cost when they lost the bid originally (pp. 352-353). 
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This is a great example of the public sector innovating and finding ways to provide 
services efficiently and productively when given the proper incentives. 
 Two more principles, which are somewhat related, are that government ought to 
be mission-driven and results-oriented. Public institutions that focus less on rules and 
budgets and more on asking basic questions such as “What is our goal?” and “What are 
we trying to accomplish?” produce more effective results. Likewise, shifting from 
focusing on inputs to outputs provides a way to hold managers accountable for 
producing a pre-determined level of service that policymakers desire (Osborne, 1993, p. 
353). 
 Finally, governments ought to become more enterprising with regard to the way 
they generate revenue. Most governments spend the majority of their time thinking about 
how to spend the money they have been allocated, but they should be spending a fair 
amount of time figuring out new revenue streams. A few examples: The Milwaukee 
Sewerage District turns 60,000 tons of sewage into fertilizer every year and sells it for 
$7.5 million in revenue; Phoenix siphons off the methane byproduct of their wastewater 
treatment plant and sells it to Mesa for a $750,000 profit; Chicago turned a $2 million 
cost into a $2 million profit by contracting out the towing of abandoned cars to a private 
company (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. 197). These are smart ways to generate revenue 
without having to go to constituents and ask for property tax or sales tax increases. 
Another method of revenue generation, which is proving to be more popular than taxes, 
is user fees. It is popular, according to Osborne and Gaebler, because it is a fairer system 
of generating revenue: those who benefit from the service and can afford to pay for the 
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service do so (conversely, those who cannot afford to do not). User fees are not 
appropriate for everything, but they work under three conditions: the service is a private 
good (benefitting those who use it), those who do not pay for the service can be 
excluded, and fees can be collected efficiently (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, pp. 203-204). 
 Kearney, Feldman, and Scavo (2000) analyzed the attitudes of city managers 
about Reinventing Government principles and which ideas/principles have they 
implemented in the previous five years. Their survey found that:  
City managers are highly supportive of reinvention principles. Nearly all 
respondents believe that taxpayers should be treated as customers, that third party 
contracting and competition in service delivery are acceptable, that government 
should be mission driven and entrepreneurial, and that non-tax revenue sources 
should be developed. (p. 544) 
 Less popular ideas of Reinventing Government included the ideas that 
governments should steer, but not row; that financial incentives should be provided to 
entrepreneurial employees; and that preference should be given for increased user fees 
over tax increases. City managers did have reservations about a few of the principles, 
particularly accountability issues that arise with privatization (p. 544-545). 
 Finally, the authors also found that (perhaps unsurprisingly) managers’ attitudes 
do not always turn into action. For example, only 35.1% of respondents had changed 
their budget to fund outcomes rather than inputs in the last five years. And, although 
more than 80% of respondents “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with the idea that financial 
incentives should be provided to entrepreneurial employees, only 47% of respondents 
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had recommended setting aside funds to do so (Kearney, Feldman, & Scavo, 2000, p. 
541). 
 Others are more skeptical of certain aspects of the Reinventing Government 
philosophy. Schacter (1995) notes that some criticize the customer-oriented nature of 
reinventing government, calling it the wrong metaphor for the relationship between 
citizens and their government. Instead of customers, the citizens are owners. Citizens as 
owners have the ability to elect leaders who represent their interests, not just be passive 
consumers “limited to liking or disliking services and hoping that administrators will 
change delivery if enough customers object” (p. 530). 
 Bacon et al. (1996) are not convinced by the flatter, more decentralized hierarchy 
prescribed in Reinventing Government. They emphasize the importance of middle 
managers having dual roles in government: “helping to define ‘acceptable service’ and 
making the delivery of public services accountable.” It is argued that efforts to privatize, 
contract out for services, or otherwise reinvent government to eliminate layers of 
government do not appreciate what those middle layers of do for the functioning of 
government (p. 359). Osborne and Gaebler (1992) discount middle managers as 
superfluous figures that stand in the way of decisions made by employees in order to 
justify their existence (p. 265). 
 Walker et al. (2011) investigated the relationship between governments being 
more market-oriented and possibly improved public sector performance in the context of 
English local government. They found that market orientation improves the citizens’ 
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perceptions of public sector performance, but its impact on the local managers is 
negligible (p. 707).  
 Others take a more holistic approach to criticizing Reinventing Government. The 
title of Moe’s 1994 piece, “The ‘Reinventing Government’ Exercise: Misinterpreting the 
Problem, Misjudging the Consequences” says it all. Moe calls it less a roadmap for 
effective government, and more a “series of success stories resulting from the 
application of these principles” (1994, p. 112). Further, he takes issue that the ten 
principles of entrepreneurial government are not stated in a theory-relevant manner that 
would make them subject to empirical proof or disproof (Moe, 1994, p.112).  
 The context of Moe’s criticism lies in the Clinton Administration’s From Red 
Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less. Moe notes 
that most of the success stories in Reinventing Government are from local service 
delivery and its lessons are less applicable to the federal government (Moe, 1994, p. 
112). His prescription: “Lines of authority and accountability need to be sharpened to 
department and agency heads, not meshed. Agencies should be headed by single 
administrators, not committees... Government agencies should be assigned functions that 
are administrable and provided sufficient in-house resources (including mid-level 
managers) to insure that contractors can be supervised and held accountable.” Later, he 
adds, “Stop the mythologizing and be tough minded” (Moe, 1994, p. 119).  
New Public Management Versus New Public Service 
 The principles of Osborne and Gaebler’s Reinventing Government were 
enshrined in a new paradigm, New Public Management (NPM). Frederickson (1996) 
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provides a thorough look at the similarities and differences of the Reinventing 
Government and NPM philosophies. Though the two are very similar, Frederickson 
frames reinventing government as a government outsider’s way of “flamboyantly” 
reforming government. New public management, on the other hand, is a quiet movement 
of practitioners and scholars within the field of public administration coming around to 
similar conclusions about the necessity for reform (1996, p. 269). 
 With regard to management style and organizational structure, the two 
movements are largely similar, says Frederickson. Both recognize the need for a change 
in the way of doing business, and also value government responsiveness. The two 
movements begin to diverge in their approach: NPM is “more institutional and political 
whereas reinvention is less concerned with capable institutions and seeks to sidestep 
political issues” (Frederickson, 1996, p. 269). The two movements diverge more sharply 
with regard to their values. Reinventing Government “elevates the values of individual 
choice, the provision of incentives, the use of competition, and the market as a model for 
government. New public [management] is concerned more with humanistic and 
democratic administration, concerned more with institution building and professional 
competence…” (Frederickson, 1996, p. 269). 
 Robert Denhardt and Janet Vinzant Denhart provide a critique of the NPM and 
offer a new paradigm in the form of “new public service.” In their view, the arguments 
for the new public administration are always framed in the context of the old public 
administration. In this sense, NPM will always win those arguments (Denhardt & 
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Denhardt, 2000, p. 549). The new public service is an altogether different movement that 
can offer a better ideological contrast to NPM. 
 At heart, Denhardt and Denhardt take issue with the notion that governments 
ought to “steer.” Focusing too much on steering loses sight of the fact that citizens own 
the boat in the first place. They assert that the focus of government ought to be on 
serving and empowering the citizens, while building responsive public institutions with 
integrity (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000, p. 549).  
 The new public service offers seven lessons for public administrators: 
 1. Serve, rather than steer.  
 2. The public interest is the aim, not the by-product. 
 3. Think strategically, act democratically. 
 4. Serve citizens, not customers. 
 5. Accountability isn’t simple. 
 6. Value people, not just productivity. 
 7. Value citizenship and public service above entrepreneurship (Denhardt & 
Denhardt, 2000, pp. 553-557).  
 The lessons and principles of the new public service are markedly different from 
that of new public management. Denhardt and Denhardt are keen on not losing sight of 
the fact that governments are there to serve the government interest, and are sure to not 
throw the baby out with the bathwater when maximizing productivity and flattening 
hierarchies. The authors realize that their model is normative (as is NPM in many 
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respects), but public administrators have to assess their core values before executing 
their vision of bureaucratic reform. 
Theoretical Foundations for Privatization 
 This paper utilizes a few different theoretical foundations. The first is the 
definition of public good. The second is a conversation on market failure and the 
necessity for government to provide a service. The last is a conversation on the 
incentives that can produce government failure in the provision of services. 
  The first thing to discuss is public goods. It is important knowing what type of 
good one is trying to provide so that it can be provided effectively and efficiently. A 
public good is one that is not excludable and nonrival, meaning that people cannot be 
excluded from using a good, and the use of one person does not affect another’s ability 
to use that product. Classic examples of public goods are lighthouses, radio broadcasts, 
and national defense (Varian, 1992, p. 414). 
 There are other types of goods, including private goods, club goods, and common 
goods. Private goods are excludable and rival, meaning people can be excluded from 
consuming a good, and their use diminishes another person’s ability to use that good. A 
private good is the ordinary case of goods being bought on the private market: bread, for 
example. Club goods are excludable and nonrival. An example of this is satellite 
television, where only those who purchase the receiver are able to use the service, but 
the number of receivers does not degrade the signal. Lastly, common goods are non-
excludable and rival. A crowded street is an example of this because anyone can use the 
	   18	  
street, but the more people who use it the less available it is for everyone else (Varian, 
1992, pp. 414-415).  
 Walsh notes five instances in which the private market will fail to provide the 
“optimum mix of goods and services,” which necessitates government action (1995, p. 
6). This list includes public goods, increasing returns to scale, externalities, merit goods, 
and information asymmetries. Public goods are problematic on the private market 
because consumers have an incentive to free-ride on the services, leading the market to 
supply less or none at all (Walsh, 1995, p. 7). Varian (1992) concurs, and states, 
“[P]rivate markets are often not a very good mechanism for allocating public goods. 
Generally, other social institutions, such as voting, must be used” (p. 415). 
 Second, markets may fail when there are increasing returns to scale. This means 
that there are decreasing unit costs as more products are produced. This usually occurs 
when a large initial investment is necessary to begin providing the good, which provides 
a barrier to entry for many firms. This can lead to monopoly conditions in the market 
(Walsh, 1995, p. 8). Third, markets fail when negative externalities are not priced into 
the cost of goods. This can take the form of pollution. Fourth, government provision is 
necessary for merit goods, which are goods that are beneficial to society when all 
members partake in the good. Examples of this include health and education. Finally, 
government action can be necessary if there are information asymmetries between the 
producers and users of a good. This necessitates government regulation or a role as an 
information provider (Walsh, 1995, pp. 9-12). Megginson (2005) notes that in extreme 
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cases of asymmetry, regulation is not enough and public ownership of the enterprise is 
necessary (p. 37).  
 Now that it has been identified when markets fail and government ought to step 
in, an examination of the incentives and circumstances that make governments fail is 
prudent. Megginson (2005) offers four reasons that state ownership is inherently less 
efficient than private ownership. First, state-owned enterprises (SEOs) are inefficient 
due to weak or adverse incentives. The profit motive for entrepreneurs in the private 
sector is axiomatic in economics, but public-sector employees do not have this incentive. 
Because of this, they rationally choose to not aggressively seek efficiency gains (pp. 38-
39). Second, SEOs are argued to be less efficient because of inadequate monitoring. 
Megginson notes that since SEOs are owned by all citizens collectively, no one person 
has incentive to monitor SEO managers. Elected leaders also have little incentive to 
regulate these because it requires a lot of work up front to learn about the organizations, 
and there is little electoral payoff to doing so (pp. 39-40). Soft budget constraints also 
hinder SEOs from being optimally efficient. In the private markets, a firm that is 
inefficient faces bankruptcy or a hostile takeover, but what incentive is there in the 
public sector? A public manager knows that his funding comes from the government and 
can feel confident that will continue to be the case (p. 40). Finally, SEOs are inefficient 
because governments use them to pursue noneconomic objectives. Because SEOs are 
subject to political forces, they may be driven to make decisions that are not 
economically optimal because they are politically optimal. This can include building a 
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factory in politically desirable locations and pricing outputs at below market rates (p. 
41).  
 These are the theoretical foundations that public managers and policymakers 
must grapple with when deciding to privatize a service or try to effectively provide it 
through the public sector. They must realize that there are incentives in the private 
market that make it difficult to provide a public good efficiently and effectively, while 
there are also incentives in place in the public sector that make providing these goods 
problematic. 
Motivations For Privatization Adoption 
 Two studies address how different stakeholders form their beliefs about 
supporting privatization of services. The first study relates to water privatization in 
Argentina and the beliefs of citizens about such a proposal. The study found that citizens 
had a negative opinion about water privatization; their average rating of 4 on a 1-10 
scale, which is the lowest passing grade in the Argentine school system (Di Tella et al., 
2012, p. 565). The study also evaluated how propaganda and program results affected 
those beliefs. Propaganda had a limited positive effect on citizens’ beliefs. With regard 
to results, the researchers found a statistically significant increase in opinions about 
privatization. Though significant, the size of the effect is small when taking into account 
the large gains in access and lower cost experienced by the citizens (Di Tella et al., 2012, 
p. 565). This study shows that, at the end of the day, citizens want results. If that can be 
done by privatization, their minds can be changed. 
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 Krebs and Pelissero (2010) investigated city councils and what influences their 
decisions to adopt Reinventing Government policies. There is a positive correlation 
between increasing tenure of city administrators and council adoption of reinventing 
government policies (p. 266). The most consistent significant influence on the adoption 
of reinventing government policies was the city’s economic health (p. 266). With regard 
to contracting out for services, a strong public union made contracting out for services 
less probable. Economic health, median household income, and partisan election ballots 
were positively correlated with adoption of policies for contracting services (p. 264). It is 
interesting that these reforms are implemented in affluent cities with positive economic 
momentum, not distressed cities that are desperately in need of reform.  
The Case Against Privatization 
 In You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For, the title says it all. Sclar (2000) 
argues that privatization by contracting for services can be useful, but is overworked and 
overdone. It is most problematic when inputs and outputs of public goods are hard to 
define (p. ix). Sclar argues that too much in the privatization debate is based on ideology 
and not enough in pragmatic public management. To the extent that privatization can 
bring about a smaller government with less responsibility, Sclar believes those 
proponents will be disappointed. But if their goal is to properly use contracts to make 
government more cost-effective, then there is promise (2000, pp. 4-5). 
 The heart of Sclar’s argument is that the case for privatization—that competition 
will increase efficiency and accountability in a public sector awash in inefficiency and 
perverse incentives—is too simplistic, and does not work in a complex world. Instead of 
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a world of perfect competition with rational actors having complete information, we 
have a world with incomplete information, markets that are less competitive than the 
ideal, and rational actors that are complex decision-making organizations (2000, p. 47). 
Combine that with the aforementioned hard-to-define inputs and outputs of public 
goods, and there is a real recipe for disaster. 
 Funnel et al (2009) take a different tact when critiquing privatization. They argue 
that core, or “sovereign,” government responsibilities ought not be privatized because of 
their political necessity, regardless of economic performance. These services include 
education, defense, police, prisons, public transport, and economic infrastructure (p. 12). 
On the other hand, peripheral responsibilities such as air travel, cleaning services, banks, 
and insurance can be privatized effectively because they can operate in the private 
market more naturally (p. 21).  
 In times of great distress, such as economic crises or natural disasters, the private 
markets pull back and seek to minimize any potential harm for themselves. What if the 
private market is trying to provide a “core” government responsibility during such an 
event (Funnel et al, 2009, pp. 24-25)? 
 Another issue in the privatization debate is that of the democratic deficit. In his 
classic work, Mosher (1982) was already grappling with the fact that appointed 
bureaucrats, not elected officials, were making the vast majority of decisions in 
government and these decisions have ramifications on society and the economy (p.1). 
How is this issue compounded when some government functions are privatized? Funnel 
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et al. believe that the democratic rights of individuals are being commoditized as the 
private market raises its level of activity in public functions (2009, p. 270).  
Analysis of Privatization Case Studies 
 Hodge (2000) provides a comprehensive analysis of privatization case studies, 
both domestically and internationally. Below is the distribution of cost savings for 135 
privatization cases from the public sector to the private sector. The mean cost savings is 
13.8%, with standard deviation of 38.  
 
Figure 3.1:Distribution of Reported Cost-Savings Estimates 
Source: (Hodge, 2000, Figure 7.1) 
 
 The following is a list of studies conducted between 1976 and 1994 on the 
contracting out of public sector services, as selected by Hodge (2000). These studies 
have analyzed a wide array of public services both domestically and abroad. The table 
0	  
10	  
20	  
30	  
40	  
50	  
N
um
be
r	  
Re
po
rt
ed
	  
Percentage	  Cost	  Savings	  Reported	  (%)	  
	   24	  
below lists the authors, services contracted, change in cost, change in quality of services, 
and any additional comments. 
 
Table 3.1: Privatization Case Studies, as Selected by Hodge 
Study Country/Activity Change in Costs (%) 
Change in 
Quality Comments 
Kemper 
and 
Quigley 
1976 
Over 100 US cities, 
refuse collection 
Contracting 
saved 20%  
Private (individual) 
collection was 30% 
more expensive than 
municipal, but 
contracted collection 
was 20% than municipal 
collection 
Savas 
1977 
315 US cities in 1975, 
four functions -15 to -29 Improved 
Random sample of 
cities, savings obtained 
when public and private 
sector won contract. 
Regression showed cost 
savings greatest for 
largest cities. 
Edwards 
and 
Stevens 
1978 
77 US cities in 1975, 
refuse collection -10 to -41  
Employed econometric 
and regression models, 
savings greater for 
largest cities 
Savas 
1980 
206 US cities, refuse 
collection 
Contracting 
saved 20%  
Price of private 
collection 22% less than 
municipal costs 
Berenyi 
1981 
10 US local councils, 
1971-77, refuse 
collection 
-7 to -50 None 
Cost reduction obtained 
when either private or 
public sector won 
contract 
Kramer 
and 
Terrell 
1984 
81 local councils, 
social and welfare 
services in San 
Francisco 
Usually 
reduced  
Changes in cost not 
quantified 
Stevens 
1984 
121 US cities, and 
eight services in Los 
Angeles area in 1980 
up to 49% 
cost 
reduction 
Quality 
maintained 
Multiple regression 
analysis. Savings varied 
with payroll preparation 
at the lowest, and 
asphalt overlay 
construction at the 
highest. 
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Table 3.1 continued 
Folz 1985 
Productivity is 
analyzed in 14 
US cities 
not 
quantified  
Costs reduced for one 
group of the two 
analyzed. The 
productivity of cities 
that contracted out is 
higher than those that do 
not. 
Mehay and 
Gonzalez 1985 
53 local council 
and county 
governments in 
US, three 
functions 
-9 to -20  
Study of contracting 
between levels of 
government, based on 
regression analysis. 
McDavid 1985 
126 local 
councils in 
Canada, refuse 
collection 
-24 to -29, 
+28 to -68  
Multiple regression, cost 
reductions usually larger 
when contract won by 
private sector rather 
than mix of private and 
public contractor. 
Hartley and 
Huby 1986 
213 UK local 
government 
councils and 
NHS 
Averaged -
26, +28 to 
-68 
Reduced in 
25% of cases 
Based on a 1985 survey 
with 57% response rate, 
data and methodology 
sound. 
Domberger, 
Meadowcroft, 
and Thompson 
1986 
Refuse collection 
by 305 local 
councils in UK 
-20 No change Multiple regression, change in cost per ton. 
Millward 1986 
103 local 
councils in 
Switzerland, 
refuse collection 
-20  
Employed multiple 
regression analysis 
Pirie 1986 
55 local councils 
in UK, several 
functions 
-20 to -40  
Based on survey, but 
unclear whether sample 
was representative. 
Domberger, 
Meadowcroft, 
and Thompson 
1987 
Domestic 
services in a 
sample of over 
2000 UK 
hospitals 
-20 to -30  
Multiple regression 
analysis employed. 
Feldman 1987 
Costs for 68 bus 
transit firms in 
the US 
"Weak 
evidence"  
Weak evidence only is 
found for greater private 
efficiency. Contracting 
is unlikely to result in 
significant cost savings 	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Table 3.1 continued 
Moore 1987 
US federal 
government 
defense and air 
traffic control 
-30 to -50  
Review by US 
Administration of 
Defense contracts and 
air traffic control 
operations 
Confederation 
of British 
Industry 1988 
Range of UK 
central 
government, NHS, 
and local 
governments 
-17 to -28  
Cost reductions 23% for 
central government, 
17% National Health 
Service and 28% local 
government. 
Hensher 1987 London buses in the mid-1980s 
Averaged 
-20  
Change in costs 
compared to public 
monopoly levels prior to 
competitive tendering. 
Carver 1989 
Property tax 
assessment service 
for 100 local 
communities in 
Massachusetts 
+24% 
more 
expensive  
Multiple regression 
analysis, controlling for 
population 
Mennenmeyer 
and Olinger 
1989 
Hospital care for 
Medicaid patients, 
267 hospitals in 
CA 
-10 to -23  
11% to 23% price 
concessions were 
achieved by contracting 
Pack 1989 15 US councils, several functions -5 to -60 
33% of 
councils 
dissatisfied 
Initial cost reductions of 
-5 to -60% declined over 
a five-year period 
Evatt Research 
Centre 1990 
460 local councils 
in Australia, large 
number of 
functions 
Usually 
increased 
Usually 
reduced 
Based on observations 
of survey respondents 
Harding 1990 Bus transport in US schools +18 to -35 None 
Two statistical models 
produced mixed 
findings. 
Rimmer and 
Webb 1990 
127 local councils 
in Australia, three 
functions 
-10 to -24  
Difference in average 
costs between councils 
using CTC and those 
using in-house provision 	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Table 3.1 continued 
Holcombe 
1991 
Seven privatization 
agreements for 
wastewater 
treatment 
operations 
reviewed 
Contracts 
more 
expensive  
After controlling for 
other factors, theoretical 
benefits of contracting 
are not passed onto 
clients. 
Rehfuss 
1991 
Several case studies 
in US during 1980s -19 to -65  
Competition, not just 
contracting, is seen as 
the driver of efficiencies 
Walsh 1991 
Survey of 40 UK 
local councils, 
several functions 
Averaged -6 
to -7, +6 to -
17  
Government-supported 
study, high-quality data, 
change in costs after one 
year of compulsory 
CTC 
Albin 1992 
58 cities in 
Australia, functions 
not specified 
Usually 
reduced None 
Bivariate regression 
analysis, cost reductions 
not quantified 
Domberger 
et al. 1993 
65 state 
government 
agencies in 
Australia, several 
functions 
-4 to -51  
Cost reductions vary 
according to function, 
with building and 
vehicle maintenance 
yielding the highest 
savings, whilst 
transportation and 
catering produced less 
savings 
Martin and 
Stein 1993 
Total spending on 
seven functions 
over 877 cities in 
US 
-44 to +28%  
Although contracting 
reduced employment, 
reductions in total 
spending for the same 
functions were not 
found 
Paddon 
1993 
Review of UK and 
Europe experience 
Mixed 
findings  
Savings are not 
guaranteed, and quality 
and accountability are 
problems 
Rimmer 
1993 
327 local councils 
in Australia, several 
functions 
Commonly 
no change  
Multiple regression, 
some cost reductions in 
city councils but not in 
rural 	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Table 3.1 continued 
Savas 1993 
Many US and 
international 
studies reviewed 
-28 to -50, 
and -37%  
Savings quoted were 
between 28 and 50% 
(before and after 
studies), 33% (time 
series studies), and 37% 
from the threat of 
contracting out. 
Farago and 
Domberger 
1994 
Survey of 
government 
business 
enterprises 
-8 to -46  
Enterprises providing 
gas, water, electricity, 
and sewerage services. 
Green 1994 
Productivity 
ratios for 70 US 
cities, six 
functions 
Mixed 
findings  
Mixed findings provided 
little support to suggest 
that efficiency was 
higher in cities that used 
private firms to provide 
public services. 
Centre for 
Public 
Services 1995 
General review 
of UK experience 
in contracting 
N/A  
Contracted services 
resulted in corruption 
and secret business 
influence in government 
Domberger, 
Hall, and Li 
1994 
61 contracts for 
cleaning services 
in Australia 
A 13% 
increase to a 
54% cost 
decrease 
7% decrease to 
36% 
improvement 
Competitive tendering 
reduces prices and raises 
the performance of 
contractors. The 
influence of ownership 
is negligible. 
Source: (Hodge, 2000, Table 7.4) 
  
 Out of 39 studies listed by Hodge, 27 show cost reductions when services were 
contracted out. These studies, though anecdotal, seem to back up the literature that has 
been reviewed in this section. Privatization and contracting out public services have 
great promise to increase efficiency and performance through competition and 
accountability, but by no means constitute a silver bullet. Real concerns are raised when 
governments contract private services. The Centre for Public Services study in 1995 
showed that contracted services “resulted in corruption and secret business influence in 
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government.” Examples such as this are what opponents to government reform point to, 
and they are correct in their concern.  
Literature on Sandy Springs, Georgia 
 The literature on Sandy Springs is surprisingly light. For a city that so proudly 
and publicly privatized the vast majority of its government operations, limited academic 
research has been undertaken. One such study is an honors thesis written by Stubbs 
(2008). The study sought to compare the costs of a selected bundle of government 
services (the selected bundle being the services Sandy Springs contracted for: general 
operations, public works, culture and recreation, and economic and community 
development). The study compared Sandy Springs’ expenditure per capita for the bundle 
of services against other large cities in the area: Marietta, Peachtree City, Duluth, 
Roswell, and Alpharetta. The study found that Sandy Springs was the most efficient city 
out of the cities selected for the study. Sandy Springs was 21.7% more efficient than the 
average in fiscal year 2008 (p. 41). By only analyzing tax expenditure per capita, the 
study essentially holds output constant, so the study analyzes cost, not value or 
performance. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 The methodology for this study is best divided into two parts: inputs and outputs. 
The fiscal years examined for each of these cities are 2008 through 2012. The inputs are 
the actual dollars spent in the defined departments of each city government divided by 
the population of the city in that year. That yields the city’s total expenditure per capita. 
By holding output constant, this dollars spent per capita figure measures the efficiency 
of a municipal government, measuring dollars spent per citizen to provide services. The 
outputs are real data points applicable to the finance, public works, recreation, and 
community development. The last data points are rankings in overall quality of life 
studies conducted by other researchers. Utilizing a performance analysis model that 
measures government output against their inputs gives an indication of a government’s 
performance and effectiveness.  
Inputs 
 Though each city uniquely organizes their respective bureaucracy, this study 
seeks to pare down their budgets so that real comparisons can be made between the 
cities. If there is a zero on a budget line, it does not necessarily mean that the city does 
not spend any money on that particular program, but rather that the city does not have a 
dedicated department and is housed elsewhere. For example, Johns Creek (until 2012) 
and Sandy Springs (to date) do not have dedicated information technology departments, 
but money for information technology is found in their general operations budget. The 
budget figures are the “amended” or “actual” dollars spent by each city, as found in their 
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respective budgets for the following fiscal year. This allows us to see what the cities 
actually spent instead of what they planned to spend in a given fiscal year. The 
population figures for 2010 are from the U.S. Census taken in that year, while the rest of 
the population figures are estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau.  
Table 3.1: City of Alpharetta Expenditures, FY2008-2012 
 
Department 20081 20092 20103 20114 20125 
City Council 276,864 268,037 286,597 301,165 288,115 
City Manager 1,388,398 1,465,559 1,339,210 1,254,194 1,391,344 
City Clerk 383,421 313,163 423,018 270,292 275,000 
Legal Services 445,587 400,000 400,000 400,000 480,000 
Finance 2,310,964 2,801,064 2,859,994 2,866,211 3,011,909 
General Operations 0 0 0 0 0 
Human Resources 802,173 432,120 402,174 401,777 391,153 
Information Technology 1,330,557 1,504,549 1,318,623 1,323,565 1,291,483 
Public Works 7,358,261 7,936,459 6,643,472 6,596,083 6,760,909 
Recreation 6,803,179 6,996,125 6,768,684 6,668,406 6,708,093 
Communications 0 0 0 0 0 
Community Development 1,978,747 2,125,786 2,118,403 2,028,382 1,961,072 
      Total Expenditure 23,078,151 24,242,862 22,560,175 22,110,075 22,559,078 
Population 54,830 56,286 57,551 59,387 61,981 
Exp. Per Capita 420.90 430.71 392.00 372.30 363.97 
 
1. City of Alpharetta, 2008, p. 22. 
2. City of Alpharetta, 2009, p. 27. 
3. City of Alpharetta, 2010, p. 31. 
4. City of Alpharetta, 2011, p. 34. 
5. City of Alpharetta, 2012, p. 42. 
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Table 3.2: City of Johns Creek Expenditures, FY2008-2012 
 
Department 20081 20092 20103 20114 20125 
City Council 269,100 219,870 277,617 235,985 266,294 
City Manager 821,500 902,325 1,092,463 1,450,074 1,441,697 
City Clerk 314,300 197,572 188,115 346,596 397,265 
Legal Services 569,000 492,900 525,000 600,000 600,000 
Finance 1,657,200 1,538,693 1,473,958 1,351,198 1,423,425 
General Operations 5,989,120 5,809,887 5,209,986 835,678 279,043 
Human Resources 0 83,731 558,724 2,858,175 2,858,175 
Information Technology 0 0 0 0 0 
Public Works 6,943,342 7,253,839 6,747,885 5,981,216 5,981,216 
Recreation 764,865 813,579 879,433 1,536,279 1,536,279 
Communications 0 0 0 1,018,014 1,018,014 
Community Development 5,854,200 5,333,287 4,827,732 3,121,329 3,121,329 
      Total Expenditure 23,182,627 22,645,683 21,780,913 19,334,544 18,922,737 
Population 72,844 74,929 76,728 79,473 82,306 
Exp. Per Capita 318.25 302.23 283.87 243.28 229.91 
 
1. City of Johns Creek, 2008, p. 1. 
2. City of Johns Creek, 2009, p. 1. 
3. City of Johns Creek, 2010, p. 1. 
4. City of Johns Creek, 2011, p. 1. 
5. City of Johns Creek, 2012, p. 36. 
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Table 3.3: City of Milton Expenditures, FY2008-2012 
 
Department 20081 20091 20101 20111 20121 
City Council 555,565 193,296 144,069 143,207 173,224 
City Manager 393,809 191,702 256,736 287,427 290,917 
City Clerk 535,812 650,477 340,769 203,138 207,949 
Legal Services 280,528 179,943 229,397 195,979 231,642 
Finance 824,050 1,136,717 694,769 462,168 458,680 
General Operations 0 0 31,769 29,866 40,157 
Human Resources 358,832 337,410 206,264 218,681 236,799 
Information Technology 682,064 975,986 833,190 448,021 484,523 
Public Works 1,756,381 2,190,954 1,702,796 1,323,860 1,490,622 
Recreation 159,413 158,457 135,109 313,815 367,880 
Communications 175,236 499,884 217,878 80,257 86,813 
Community Development 1,365,308 1,620,631 866,124 699,316 802,453 
      Total Expenditure 7,086,998 8,135,457 5,658,870 4,405,735 4,871,659 
Population 29,210 31,119 32,661 33,893 35,015 
Exp. Per Capita 242.62 261.43 173.26 129.99 139.13 
 
1. City of Milton, 2012a, p. 14. 
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Table 3.4: City of Roswell Expenditures, FY2008-2012 
 
Department 20081 20091 20102 20113 20124 
City Council 450,837 426,933 427,265 403,224 410,737 
City Manager 370,915 433,925 404,724 448,496 489,226 
City Clerk 0 0 0 0 0 
Legal Services 407,562 457,348 457,614 496,870 469,017 
Finance 2,266,544 2,424,313 2,323,659 2,203,545 2,350,432 
General Operations 1,007,073 751,049 957,950 626,532 577,119 
Human Resources 553,545 563,144 550,656 461,418 440,873 
Information Technology 1,320,599 1,337,665 1,368,393 1,437,446 1,541,397 
Public Works 1,548,497 1,698,177 2,063,892 1,708,987 955,353 
Recreation 10,512,064 10,068,447 9,919,893 9,801,924 9,874,192 
Communications 419,246 434,386 402,434 407,597 406,409 
Community Development 3,534,854 3,698,776 3,589,322 3,208,895 3,014,000 
      Total Expenditure 22,391,736 22,294,163 22,465,802 21,204,934 20,528,755 
Population 85,751 87,089 88,346 91,142 93,692 
Exp. Per Capita 261.13 255.99 254.29 232.66 219.11 
 
1. City of Roswell, 2010, pp. 91-207, 251-297. 
2. City of Roswell, 2011, pp. 77-176, 211-248. 
3. City of Roswell, 2012, pp. 77-177, 211-251. 
4. City of Roswell, 2013, pp. 84-196, 237-294. 
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Table 3.5: City of Sandy Springs Expenditures, FY2008-2012 
 
Department 20081 20091 20102 20112 20123 
City Council 146,946 161,059 152,794 145,560 148,490 
City Manager 528,986 684,716 749,268 676,322 582,376 
City Clerk 161,628 50,533 565,925 418,786 114,817 
Legal Services 461,046 708,315 726,335 673,769 822,107 
Finance 1,928,143 2,064,354 1,225,373 2,932,296 2,117,674 
General Operations 9,330,516 10,029,320 10,908,320 8,375,978 2,159,794 
Human Resources 0 0 0 0 0 
Information Technology 0 0 0 0 1,629,889 
Public Works 9,509,930 10,512,231 10,569,874 12,217,511 9,673,690 
Recreation 1,136,275 1,040,814 2,462,009 2,574,783 2,709,325 
Communications 0 0 0 0 1,380,873 
Community Development 6,282,777 6,505,741 6,986,097 3,764,554 2,631,710 
      Total Expenditure 29,486,247 31,757,083 34,345,995 31,779,559 23,970,745 
Population 90,980 92,466 93,853 96,944 99,419 
Exp. Per Capita 324.10 343.45 365.96 327.81 241.11 
 
1. City of Sandy Springs, 2010c, pp. 23-30, 37-40. 
2. City of Sandy Springs, 2012b, p. 37. 
3. City of Sandy Springs, 2013, p. 1. 
 
Table 3.6: Expenditure Per Capita, FY2008-2012 
 
City / Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Alpharetta 420.90 430.71 392.00 372.30 363.97 
Johns Creek 318.25 302.23 283.87 243.28 229.91 
Milton 242.62 261.43 173.26 129.99 139.13 
Roswell 261.13 255.99 254.29 232.66 219.11 
Sandy Springs 324.10 343.45 365.96 327.81 241.11 
Average 310.73 312.59 275.86 244.56 238.03 
 (Note: The “Average” figures do not include Sandy Springs.) 
 
 This study uses the expenditure per capita figures from Table 3.6 in its 
performance analysis. As these figures are the denominator of the model, a city that 
spends less per capita receives a better performance score.  
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Outputs 
 The outputs used by this study have been chosen for a few different reasons. 
First, the data had to be collected by all of the cities so that appropriate comparisons can 
be drawn. Second, since the data had to be collected by the author through the use of 
interviews, emails, public information requests, and city annual reports, the data needed 
to be public. Finally, the data collected needed to address government capacity and/or 
the wellbeing of the city. This analysis is by no means comprehensive, but does provide 
a foundation for further analysis. The output data are meant to compare each city’s 
community development, finance, parks and recreation, and public works departments, 
as well as the city’s overall quality of life. 
 The data presented in the following pages were turned into rankings (1=lowest 
through 5=highest) to compare each city’s performance with each other. These rankings 
were then used in the numerator of a performance model, so that a higher score is better. 
 Community development. The data used to measure community development 
departments are the number of residential and commercial construction permits issued, 
as well as the total number of business licenses issued. The assumption is that more is 
better for two reasons. First, it assesses the community development departments’ ability 
to process a high volume of permits. More permits and licenses also are an indicator of a 
healthy city, where private persons and businesses are investing in their homes and 
businesses in the city. 
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Table 3.7: Residential and Commercial Construction Permits Issued, FY2008-2012 
 
City/Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Alpharetta1 851 585 618 740 770 
Johns Creek2 559 208 272 277 417 
Milton3 553 397 376 351 454 
Roswell4 126 59 80 139 177 
Sandy Springs5 1516 1254 No Data No Data 705 
Average 522 312 337 377 455 
  
 1. D. Crowley, personal communication, October 25, 2013. 
 2. C. Lindo, personal communication, October 15, 2013. 
 3. S. Wilmath, personal communication, October 22, 2013. 
 4. M. Press, personal communication, October 18, 2013. 
 5. R. Talbert, personal communication, October 29, 2013. 
 
(Note: According to Sandy Springs community development officials, the department 
does not have data for FY2010 or FY2011. For the assigned rankings, Sandy Springs 
will be ranked last (5) instead of estimating the figures for those years.)  
Table 3.8: City Rankings for Construction Permits Issued, FY2008-2012 
 
City/Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Alpharetta 2 2 1 1 1 
Johns Creek 3 4 3 3 4 
Milton 4 3 2 2 3 
Roswell 5 5 4 4 5 
Sandy Springs 1 1 5 5 2 
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Table 3.9: Total Business Licenses Issued, FY2008-2012 
 
City/Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Alpharetta1 3564 3836 4183 4159 4198 
Johns Creek2 2929 2753 2525 2516 2500 
Milton3 No Data No Data No Data 1140 966 
Roswell4 5403 5293 4973 5187 5208 
Sandy Springs5 619 658 669 629 737 
Average 3965 3961 3894 3251 3218 
 
  
 1. D. Crowley, personal communication, October 25, 2013. 
 2. C. Lindo, personal communication, October 30, 2013.  
 3. S. Wilmath, personal communication, October 22, 2013.  
 4. M. Press, personal communication, October 17, 2013.  
 5. P. Wheeler, personal communication, October 21, 2013. 
 
Table 3.10 City Rankings for Total Business Licenses Issued, FY2008-2012 
 
City/Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Alpharetta 2 2 2 2 2 
Johns Creek 3 3 3 3 3 
Milton 5 5 5 4 4 
Roswell 1 1 1 1 1 
Sandy Springs 4 4 4 5 5 
 
 Finance. As a proxy for the city’s financial health, this study uses the city’s 
municipal bond rating for the rankings. Alpharetta and Roswell have AAA ratings from 
Moody’s. The cities with AAAm rankings participate in a statewide fund. This is judged 
to be second to having a AAA rating on one’s own. Johns Creek does issue bonds 
because a clause in their charter precludes them from obtaining a good rating from the 
ratings agency (Bodker, 2011).  
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Table 3.11 Municipal Bond Rating, FY2008-2012 
 
City/Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Alpharetta1 AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA 
Johns Creek - - - - - 
Milton2 - - - - AAAm 
Roswell3 AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA 
Sandy Springs4 AAAm AAAm AAAm AAAm AAAm 
 
 1. Moody’s, 2013a. 
 2. City of Milton, 2012b, p. 25.  
 3. Moody’s, 2013b.  
 4. City of Sandy Springs, 2008b, p. 25; City of Sandy Springs, 2009b, p. 25; City 
of Sandy Springs, 2010c, p. 30; City of Sandy Springs, 2011a, p.30; City of 
Sandy Springs, 2012a, p. 26.  
 
Table 3.12 City Rankings for Municipal Bond Rating, FY2008-2012 
 
City/Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Alpharetta 1 1 1 1 1 
Johns Creek 4 4 4 4 5 
Milton 4 4 4 4 3 
Roswell 1 1 1 1 1 
Sandy Springs 3 3 3 3 3 
 
 
 Parks and recreation. An indicator of a healthy parks and recreation department 
is the number of participants who sign up for its programs. The assumption here is that 
the more people who sign up, the higher the quality of the programs and/or the more 
diverse are the offerings. To control for population differences between the cities, this 
study utilizes participation rate (total participants divided by population).  
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Table 3.13: Total Program Participants, FY2008-2012 
 
City/Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Alpharetta1 11,749 13,264 15,554 15,672 18,789 
Johns Creek2 6,654 5,178 3,544 5,241 5,032 
Milton3 0 0 0 1,100 7,300 
Roswell4 38,380 38,777 34,578 34,282 33,507 
Sandy Springs5 7,250 9,010 8,050 36,500 36,500 
Average 14,196 14,305 13,419 14,074 16,157 
 
 1. City of Alpharetta, 2008a, p. 10; City of Alpharetta, 2009b, p. 10; City of 
Alpharetta, 2010b, p. 10; City of Alpharetta, 2011b, p. 10; City of Alpharetta, 
2012b, p. 10. 
 2. C. Lindo, personal communication, October 25, 2013.  
 3. City of Milton, 2012, p. 29.  
 4. M. Press, personal communication, October 18, 2013. 
 5. P. Wheeler, personal communication, October 25, 2013.  
 
Table 3.14: Participation Rate, FY2008-2012 
 
City 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Alpharetta 21.43% 23.57% 27.03% 26.39% 30.31% 
Johns Creek 9.13% 6.91% 4.62% 6.59% 6.11% 
Milton 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.25% 20.85% 
Roswell 44.76% 44.53% 39.14% 37.61% 35.76% 
Sandy Springs 7.97% 9.74% 8.58% 37.65% 36.71% 
Average 18.83% 18.75% 17.70% 18.46% 23.26% 
 
Table 3.15: City Rankings for Participation Rate, FY2008-2012 
 
City 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Alpharetta 2 2 2 3 3 
Johns Creek 3 4 4 4 5 
Milton 5 5 5 5 4 
Roswell 1 1 1 2 2 
Sandy Springs 4 3 3 1 1 
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 Public works. The output this study uses to measure the performance of each 
city’s public works department is the number of miles paved or resurfaced in a year. The 
quality of roadways in a city is important for a city’s image, as well as for the functional 
aspect of moving people around. The latter is especially true in congested, suburban 
Atlanta. 
Table 3.16: Total Miles Repaved or Resurfaced, FY2008-2012 
 
City/Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Alpharetta1 22.6 9.1 11.6 39.0 5.0 
Johns Creek2 3.5 0.0 6.1 3.6 0.9 
Milton3 4.2 0.0 9.4 13.7 11.3 
Roswell4 6.6 15.2 20.5 23.1 8.3 
Sandy Springs5 23.0 28.0 30.0 7.2 7.5 
Average 9.2 6.1 11.9 19.9 6.4 
 
 1. P. Sewczwicz, personal communication, October 22, 2013.  
 2. C. Lindo, personal communication, October 18, 2013.  
 3. City of Milton, 2011, p. 45; City of Milton, 2012, p. 11.  
 4. M. Press, personal communication, October 17, 2013.  
 5. City of Sandy Springs, 2008a, p. 20; City of Sandy Springs, 2009a, p. 15; City 
of Sandy Springs, 2010a, p. 15; City of Sandy Springs, 2011c, p. 10; City of 
Sandy Springs, 2012b, p. 9.  
 
Table 3.17 City Rankings for Total Miles Repaved or Resurfaced, FY2008-2012 
 
City/Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Alpharetta 2 3 3 1 4 
Johns Creek 5 4 5 5 5 
Milton 4 4 4 3 1 
Roswell 3 2 2 2 2 
Sandy Springs 1 1 1 4 3 
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 Quality of life. The primary goal of every policymaker and public servant in 
municipal government is to maintain the highest quality of life possible for citizens and 
constituents. The difficulty with measuring quality of life is its inherent subjectivity. 
Each citizen likes or dislikes his/her city for personal reasons. To grapple with that fact, 
this study found four quality of life rankings published during the five years presently 
examined. Each city’s position in the four rankings was averaged. The scores from this 
average were ranked and included in each year’s performance model. 
 Study 1 lists the top 100 cities in Georgia based on a “livability score.” The 
methodology includes amenities, cost of living, crime rates, education, employment, 
housing, and weather (“AreaVibes Methodology,” 2013). Study 2 examines median 
household income, average educational attainment, and property crime rates (Grant, 
2011). Study 3 is arguably the most comprehensive of these rankings, with 20 variables 
analyzed. The factors utilized in Thomas (2011) include inward migration, percentage of 
young adults, commuting times, housing affordability, and quality jobs in the city 
(classified as management or professional). Study 4 looks at the real estate market in 
each of these cities. This is a measure of how desirable it is to live in each city. The 
factors analyzed are number of houses sold and average number of days on the market 
(“Atlanta’s 100 Most Popular Neighborhoods,” 2011). The “QOL Rank” is the final 
figure used in the performance model.  
 
 
 
 
 
	   43	  
Table 3.18: Quality of Life Rankings 
 
City Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Average QOL Rank 
Alpharetta 2 1 3 1 1.75 1 
Johns Creek 4 4 2 3 3.25 3 
Milton 4 4 1 5 3.5 4 
Roswell 1 2 4 1 2 2 
Sandy Springs 3 3 5 4 3.75 5 
 
 
Performance Evaluation 
 To run the performance evaluation, these rankings that have been compiled thus 
far need to be turned into scores. To convert the rank into points, this study will assign 5 
points for a ranking of 1, 4 points for 2nd, and so on. To assign a final performance score 
for each city for a given fiscal year, this study used the equation: 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒  𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎×  100 = 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒  𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 The following tables show each city’s total points, the expenditure per capita, 
and the final performance scores.  
 
Table 4.1: Total Points, FY2008-2012 
 
City/ Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Alpharetta 26 25 26 27 24 
Johns Creek 15 14 14 14 11 
Milton 10 11 12 14 17 
Roswell 25 25 25 24 23 
Sandy Springs 16 18 15 13 17 
 
Table 4.2 Expenditure Per Capita, FY2008-2012 
 
City / Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Alpharetta 420.90 430.71 392.00 372.30 363.97 
Johns Creek 318.25 302.23 283.87 243.28 229.91 
Milton 242.62 261.43 173.26 129.99 139.13 
Roswell 261.13 255.99 254.29 232.66 219.11 
Sandy Springs 324.10 343.45 365.96 327.81 241.11 
Average 310.73 312.59 275.86 244.56 238.03 
 (Note: Average figures do not include Sandy Springs.) 
 
Table 4.3: Performance Scores, FY2008-2012 
 
City/Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Alpharetta 6.177 5.804 6.633 7.252 6.594 
Johns Creek 4.713 4.632 4.932 5.755 4.784 
Milton 4.122 4.208 6.926 10.770 12.219 
Roswell 9.574 9.766 9.831 10.315 10.497 
Sandy Springs 4.937 5.241 4.099 3.966 7.051 
Average 6.171 6.103 7.080 8.523 8.524 
 (Note: Averages do not include Sandy Springs.) 
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Expenditure Per Capita 
 Between FY2008 and FY2012, each city government cut their total expenditure 
per capita. This was a function of increasing population in all cities, as well as the effects 
of the recession manifested in budget cuts and declining tax receipts. Purely from a cost 
perspective, Sandy Springs is not the most efficient city government in this study. 
Against the average in FY2010 and FY2011, Sandy Springs’ expenditure per capita was 
more than 30% higher.  
 
Table 4.4: Sandy Springs Expenditure Per Capita Versus Average, FY2008-2012 
 
Fiscal Year Sandy Springs Average Difference 
2008 324.10 310.73 4.30% 
2009 343.45 312.59 9.87% 
2010 365.96 275.86 32.66% 
2011 327.81 244.56 34.04% 
2012 241.11 238.03 1.29% 
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Figure 4.1: Expenditure Per Capita, FY2008-2012 
 
  
 Milton had the lowest cost of government to citizens, and it cut costs in an 
interesting way: by switching from contracting out for services to the traditional public 
sector model. After contracting out all its government services to CH2M-Hill for three 
years, the city found cost savings by hiring its own personnel. Milton did this for 
FY2010, and the result is unmistakable in Figure 4.1. Interestingly, Sandy Springs also 
saw its largest cost savings when it shifted away from CH2M-Hill and instead 
competitively contracted out for each service. As a result of rebidding its contracts, 
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Sandy Springs returned toward the sample average, with costs similar to Johns Creek 
and Roswell.  
Performance Scores and Analysis 
 But costs are only one side of the equation in this study. If Sandy Springs in 2010 
and 2011 had 30% higher costs, but 40% higher quality services, it would fare well in 
the analysis. Likewise, if Milton cut costs as it did, but also found a lower quality of 
public services, its performance score would suffer. 
 As we can see, this was not the case. As Milton cut costs, it also increased its 
performance score, as the city produced better government services over time. 
 
 Figure 4.2: Performance Scores, FY2008-2012 
 
 As we can see from Table 4.1, Alpharetta and Roswell consistently had the most 
total points over the years included in the study. But Roswell was able to accomplish this 
at 68% of the cost of Alpharetta, and was ranked first in performance in FY2008-2010. 
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In FY2011 and 2012, Milton overtook Roswell as the highest performer although 
Roswell had a higher number of total points because of the cost savings Milton had 
found since 2010. It is assumed that if Milton wanted to produce the same level of 
service that Roswell has enjoyed, it could do so cost-effectively. It is worth noting that 
Johns Creek also saw an uptick in performance from FY2010 onwards, which correlated 
with its restructuring of contracts with CH2M-Hill. 
 Sandy Springs was below average in performance each year in this study, 
although its best performance came in 2012 when it shifted away from CH2M-Hill. 
Sandy Springs’ performance score took a hit in 2010 and 2011, in part, because 
community development officials were unable to retrieve construction permit data. If 
they had, it is assumed, that their scores would still be below average, and more similar 
to those of Johns Creek. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 From this analysis, it cannot be said that the Sandy Springs model is most 
efficient or most effective. With regard to cost, Sandy Springs was average only in 
FY2008 and 2012, and its performance was below average for all years examined in this 
study. Perhaps these findings are not as damning for the “Sandy Springs model” as it is 
for the city’s relation to CH2M-Hill. Each city that restructured its government service 
model away from CH2M-Hill found cost savings and/or performance increases after 
doing so. This includes the city of Milton, which went from the worst performance score 
in 2009 to the best by 2011 after ending its contract with CH2M-Hill in 2010. 
 Of course this present study is not conclusive, and further research is necessary 
in this area. Citizens and policymakers in Sandy Springs could argue that this paper asks 
the wrong question to start with; a more appropriate time frame for this analysis may not 
be from 2008 to 2012, but from 2004 to 2006, in order to do a before-and-after 
comparison over time of the Fulton County government to the City of Sandy Springs. It 
could be argued that bundling all services with one company is not the best way to 
provide services, but it is the best way to start a city from scratch. Also, this study does 
not take into account citizen satisfaction surveys, which would gauge the perceptions of 
Sandy Springs’ citizens, who had fought for incorporation for years. 
Further Research 
 Because of the limited scope of the present study, more analysis on the “Sandy 
Springs model” is necessary to give a broader view on the impact of this policy. A more 
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conclusive study would have a larger sample, one that includes cities from elsewhere in 
Georgia, the South, and the country more broadly. Though Sandy Springs was found to 
be below average in this study, this is not to say its performance was below average in 
general. This study can only say that Sandy Springs was found to perform below the 
average out of a sample of 5 affluent communities in Georgia. In addition to this, the 
experiment in Sandy Springs is still relatively young. As time passes, Sandy Springs’ 
new model of competitive bidding for each service (and not bundling the contracts for 
all services) deserves to be examined further. These methods of extreme privatization are 
extremely interesting to examine, if not necessarily the most effective from the 
perspective of policy implementation and policy analysis.  
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